Common Cents

Double Standard

Ralph Murphy

(10/16) American exports of goods and services registered a pre election gain of over $ 170 billion, offset by imports to include U.S. export owners abroad at just over $ 200 billion. That trade deficit is however financed by accounting techniques that retain the money to domestic banks. The owner registers are foreign but the money is routinely retained despite the implication of trade loss. It draws attention to world banking issues that do have to be further explored as for example the euro system fostered by the European Union has all but collapsed and the trade implications to dependent systems and people’s require restoration of civil control.

The central bank functions have historically evolved to provide a nations transaction means through currency or ascribed symbolic value to facilitate or enable trade. There’s also a bank regulatory function within other legislated parameters. Price stability or consistent value is presumed to the role, but requires the federal issuing authority to maintain it at an agreed level. When it matches growth or earnings changes in the relevant economy there is that balance. Unfortunately there is opportunity for manipulation. Theft issues pervade many overprinting strategies, also common is funding domestic projects by overprinting rather than dropping them as the broader economy may not source it.

There are two policy " tools" available to federal authority that affect the money supply and fund provision in fiscal or spending and monetary controls. Federal spending is largely covered by taxes. There is suspect tariff revenues from specified trade charges but the levels are relatively low and political. Post World War Two there was also deficit spending or alleged borrowing by the federal government to finance extraneous projects. That outflow appears to have actually been covered by tax policies and the listed world deficit of over $70 trillion a sick joke as it was fabrication for accountant interest payments. The American deficit was due over $23 trillion despite all bills met, Europe was similar, Japan was alleged at over 250% the nations earnings but don’t have to pay it either in recent fraud revelations of the sourcing.

The issue now is the banking structures and the awkward policy cost presumption of verisimilitude to cross border economies when they are internally vastly different. In the late 1990’s a complex scheme of combining European central banks into one large European Central Bank was devised in anticipation of adopting a common currency or the infamous euro that was introduced shortly after into 19 of the then 28 European Union members. it was backed and managed by New York financiers with point spender the Frankfurt, German based Deutsche Bank.

European banks before that era or time frame were very regional in focus. They’d seldom be able to deal cross border, but with the passage of that consolidation bill there was sudden access to coordinated project funding previously impossible to that group. Deutsche Bank spearheaded the European spending campaign with assets more tripling to over$2 trillion by 2012. It seemed to float the whole ECB although official policy coordination was credited to the latter. The bank was topped by British financier John Cryan a year after, and plagued by American department of justice legal charges and settlements linked to money laundering, populist domestic issues as the Jefferey Epstein conviction or Libor interest rate fixing. The bank settled for over $.7 billion in fines two years ago linked to mortgage payments in suspect deals. The point is the money was made available in almost fantasy access and levels through Goldman Sachs by very unlikely source investors in some type of trade off possibly to offset focus on Far East project money. Almost none of it would yield conventional returns and to tour Europe as opposed to infrastructure in the Orient, there’s very little to show for the spending era as it seemed to have just dissolved into private accounts.

Europeans have been victimized by theft culture and issues that lead them to safeguard their assets into relatively personal control or familiar trade arrangements. Americans were able to mask similar patterns by varied repayment strategies like tax usurps their friends or relatives abroad couldn’t or wouldn’t coordinate. In the ECBs case the problem with a common currency is a common currency presumes an otherwise common internal market structure, and by nature where there remains national differentiation the economy is also affected by policies or cultural edicts that interject crippling differences to policy options and tools.

One nation may have emphasized social programs or maintain nationalized industry its neighbor wouldn’t consider a benefit nor worthwhile effort. Greece, for example, had vast education or health programs, couldn’t possibly pay them, joined the ECB and had them all written off by euro standardized funds before the program was reviewed and emergency access of $500 billion available to it and others denied after initial payment. Portugal, , Spain, and Ireland also gained then often lost the funds. Some of that may have been regional value added or tax based earnings, but it generally did seem to stem from New York bankers and to the Goldman Sachs era of coordinated funding in gifts was spent in world campaigns through Cryan before the law suits and fund withdrawals. Most of it was restored to American banks by 2017.

The problem now to Europe is the legacy structures. The registered bank levels decreased by over 30%, but assets similarly increased as regional groups adopted the American impersonal investor capacity brought on by the flood of new money from New York. I was in German recently where there’s now an extensive Sparkassen or relatively conventional bank system similar to a Wells Fargo or bigger bank here at the federal level. While there was groundwork for it as an older institution the assets and cross regional controls did still seem linked to the larger lenders. Without Goldman Sachs that was forced out by 2017 I doubt they’d long survive cross-nation. There was also a Volksbanken or grey counterpart to it that I’m sure has no real chance though asset levels or franchises were very high profile.

There’d be long lines of Russian speakers waiting for apparent gift deposits in even isolated traditional German regions similar to a Chase group in the United States. They’d "muscled in" to era but I doubt can maintain position without New York and given domestic pressures. They had largely pulled out by 2018 in favor of more traditional arrangements. The problem now is spending "withdrawal" as restoration of the original understandings will likely involve renewing regional ties as other cultural factors haven’t changed theft patterns in that short a time frame. They have to have to go back to familiar banking without the American money.

Broadly, shared currency implies shared national identity in other respects as part of a common "main". There are trade off deals linked to internal markets as part of trade policy or cultural norms that do affect price but aren’t directly obvious to purchasing agents. For a common currency to be shared equally those markets would have had to free of the internal trade differences and that has never been the universal case. Theoretically a currency could be shared if it were. In Europe’s euro "experiment" the nations merged vastly different internal program types, spending levels probably even expectation of gain as if one big congenial and lost a lot of trade currency. From subsidy o program variance, simple caps or redirects to pricing, barrier policies they were all different and heavily indebted or benefited by external payment when joined. The euro system has hobbled along, but the respective nations must restore their own currencies to reflect internal differences so clearly apparent to varied policy commitments.

That also focuses attention on trade policy and options here and abroad. The optimal government function is to facilitate and enable trade by providing the stable currency and thwart interventions with assured police action per need. As explained earnings tied to growth effectively maintain price stability. Be wary of buzz words like stimulus measures as they likely just mean irregular or debasing inflation despite the positive pitch tone for the mass appeal. If those American Care Bills had passed under that guise, coupled with the Chicago/ New York pricing cartels as planned we’d honestly be almost as poor as Venezuela the way they read to project analysis.

Fiscal or spending policy draws from internal funding as a likely small percentage of its earnings or interest. Can you imagine a project bigger than the economy as that was the prior cost claim. A federal sales tax of single digits would surely cover any likely security or basic civil needs. To allow a "blank check" of deficit spending introduced gross abuse potential, and that was realized or surpassed by the now obsolete bill.

There were other issues involved in the current system that could be further explored. Most financiers seem to resent federal leverage as a market participant since their actions were often political and not predictable profit returns. They can maintain policy options simply too costly to others with available resources given their obligations to self or others. In the money markets it’s of real concern to interest rate policy as again policy can be arbitrary or unpredictable. It’s possible to arrange expansionary funding to preferred low risk investors by credit then no cost currency provision if the funds aren’t available to them from other sourcing. That rather than interest rate broiler if the federal authority can be convinced the project would be successful. It avoids the other conflicts of interest to those markets.

The Eurosystem of shared currency was an unlikely merger of vastly different trade policies, domestic programs and cost regimens as if a big congenial one. It was brokered by New York financiers who filled the cash losses with tax spending or disguised transfers that were violently reversed or repealed to trade restriction laws like the Dodd Frank repeal. I doubt it could happen again, but the bankers do have to be watched with concern. Fund consolidation void of investor return leads to fanciful trade policy or structures as the ebbing ECB or European Union attests. Currency identity is linked to other national interests and should be maintained separate.