There had been a 'Bank for Central Banks' known as the Bank for International settlements (BIS) linked initially to German war reparation. payments following the First World War. After the Second World War there was an American attempt to disband it but European allies convinced a working group of central bankers and politicians at a 1944 Breton Woods conference in New Hampshire to adopt a fixed exchange policy linked to the dollar that guaranteed external cash payments for varied projects abroad. They included Cold War conflict management but also social programs that probably wouldn't have otherwise been funded.

The accord pegged currencies and trade flows using a newly created International Monetary Fund (IMF) for trade arbitrage or cash linked to unexpected project losses in the event payments couldn't otherwise be received. It sought very predictable payments but was of itself risk averse stressing pool fund access and actually discouraging conventional business investment to developing regions. Production hubs as the Americans. Japanese, and German economies could continue the private sector risk linked investing but to that accord were obliged to maintain what amounted to a grant system for other members. The direct funding to levels could only realistically prop the controlling political alliance group interests in developing regions not the actual production capital. It rarely included returns on the investments as the host immersion to internal programs of developing nations was too light.

The Breton Woods system formally ended in 1973 during the Nixon administration but was replaced the following year in an agreement by a group of ten central bankers from developed western nations to include Japan known as the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS). The political bankers sought to then 'rame guidelines in areas of capital adequacy, banking supervision, and cross border activities. The group known as G-10 appeared to adopt informal but effective understandings as the IMF bailouts were still available to the politicized players.

By 1988 a formal agreement had been reached and approved by the group known as Basel 1 setting minimum capital requirements of each signatures domestic banking programs. By 2004 a more formal understanding was presented as Basel 2 that modified Basel 1 capital requirements, established increased supervision of bank actions as stress testing, and tried to regulate liquidity or cash on hand as well as market risk levels. By 2009 there had been a series a legal changes that afforded vast new access to stored central bank funds here. The following year large investment banks took almost complete control of the dispersal and regulation of their funds. Almost any project could be funded with credible access no matter the investment return and it temporarily eclipsed the wildest expectation of any of the likely Basel groups beneficiaries mostly the less developed countries to include all regions as Africa, Latin America and the Far East with its trade links.

That brought world bankers to the Basel 3 measure that had been scheduled for adoption by 2012. It was an optional international protocol but ostensibly legally binding when incorporated into domestic legislation. It would slightly modify the Basel 2 accord if approved emphasizing the liquidity pillar of Basel 2 implying cash need of officials could be guaranteed. The Americans incorporated it as Federal Reserve policy that year as did the Japanese and European Unions German based Central Bank. Conservation buffer or minimum capital requirement of banks from host accords sought to ensure a predictable income access or was the only major new obstacle to its passage. While that could happen it's probably an 'exercise in futility' as the large banks that used to leverage the foreign transfers were largely defunded in favor of smaller ones by American legislators and a grateful Federal Reserve who had lost regulatory control since the 2012 legislative changes.

Planning and policy making emphasized by the Basel accords should again reflect host resources and ability to meet internal and possible cross border demand. A multinational corporation can facilitate domestic output or even make it possible where the producer's technical or other production expertise is not available to the receiver Other factors to include often extraneous political leverage of the concerns have to be considered in accepting foreign intervention but generally if a good is produced there it would be similar to import or trade interest so recognized by that standard of concern.

Multinational banks that support their own businesses cross borders have a far better chance of generating earnings than propping a foreign venture or other unsecured investment.

Basel rounds discouraged trade and therefore value creation, demanding simple grants or access to the cash for unspecified programs and can't be furthered as a policy reward by that professed intent. Governing authority can effectively monitor and regulate external funds for investment return on expectation based on the bankers past, present, or likely future ability to succeed in the foreign market. They cannot otherwise channel or redirect funding without conflicts of interest and policy must reflect that concern.

The Basel accord if advanced could reverse competition gains projected by the Dodd Frank repeals leaving big banks once again in a position of arbitrary control. As is there would be increased domestic funding available for host projects as the transfers abroad would be replaced by sales here. It's a 'rising tide' concept consistent with exchanges of both the import and export nations rather than a drain one that could be symbolized by whirlpool like losses.

Basel 3 if advanced would perpetuate a fanciful grant system for international programs and players far better served by an exchange one that emphasizes trade not simple humanitarian pitches or buzz words like inequality that may reflect lack of effort rather than opportunity. Disciplined investment linked to competent suppliers who are aware of their market demand at a point in time is still the optimal means to generate the type of lifestyle consistent with material wealth Banking cash facilitates trade interests but can be abused if not well monitored and regulated with an exchange goal of reciprocal benefit. Basel 3 would be one of continued no return earnings transfers and can no longer be discounted given awareness of the unilateral losses.